Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
State of Louisiana

No. 26-C-130

LOUIS NOEL

versus

CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., ET AL

ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 864-587, DIVISION "H"
HONORABLE DONALD L. FORET, JUDGE PRESIDING

May 19, 2026

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Jude G. Gravois, Marc E. Johnson, Stephen J. Windhorst, John J. Molaison, Jr., Scott U. Schlegel, and Timothy S. Marcel

WRIT GRANTED

SUS
SMC
JGG
SJW
JJM
TSM

JOHNSON, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS

MEJ

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SCHLEGEL, J.

Defendants, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. and Marathon Oil Company, seek supervisory review of the trial court's March 27, 2026 judgment denying their exception of *res judicata*. For the following reasons, we grant this writ application, reverse the trial court's judgment, grant defendants' exception of *res judicata*, and dismiss plaintiff's claims against them with prejudice.

On May 6, 2025, plaintiff, Louis Noel, filed a petition for damages against numerous defendants, including Chevron and Marathon, alleging that he contracted lung cancer because of workplace exposure to Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials ("NORM"). In response, defendants filed a peremptory exception of *res judicata* asserting that in a prior lawsuit — *Dottie Adams, et al. v. Joseph Grefer, et al*., 24th JDC for the Parish of Jefferson, Docket No. 624-278 ("Adams Lawsuit") — plaintiff signed a release agreement on June 27, 2016, settling all of his claims against them for personal injuries, including future claims for illnesses arising from plaintiff's alleged occupational exposure to NORM.

In opposition, plaintiff argued that he had not been diagnosed with lung cancer when he signed the release in the Adams Lawsuit and the release did not specifically address future lung cancer claims. Plaintiff further argued that the nominal settlement amount he received in the Adams Lawsuit demonstrates that he did not intend to settle his future lung cancer claims.

Following a hearing, the trial court denied the exception of *res judicata* citing the nominal amount of the settlement. Defendants filed a writ application with this Court. However, we denied the application without considering the merits because the parties did not introduce their supporting exhibits into evidence. *See Noel v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.*, 26-90, 2026 WL 655492 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/9/26). Defendants then filed a reurged exception of *res judicata*. At the hearing

held on March 11, 2026, the parties admitted all of their exhibits into evidence. The trial court denied the exception of *res judicata* without providing any additional reasons and subsequently signed a written judgment on March 27, 2026.

In their writ application, defendants argue that the Confidential Receipt, Release and Indemnity Agreement ("Adams Release") executed by plaintiff contains unequivocal language releasing defendants from liability for "all past, present and future claims, demands, actions, liabilities, causes of action and suits for occurrence or aggravation of any past, present and future personal injuries or illnesses (physical and psychological)" arising from plaintiff's alleged occupational exposure to NORM. The Adams Release specifically provides for the release of all of the following claims:

> H. **ALL CLAIMS** shall mean any and all past, present and *future claims*, controversies, demands, actions, liabilities, causes of action, or suits at law, in equity, in civil law, in common law, in tort, in contract, or of whatever kind or nature, *whether presently known or unknown*, that arise out of, are incidental to or are related directly or indirectly to the **INCIDENT**, including, but not limited to those which were or could have been asserted in the **LITIGATION**, any "citizen suits" and/or any other private cause of action under any federal and/or state statute pending or threatened. ***The definition of ALL CLAIMS** specifically includes*, but is not limited to all past, present and *future claims, demands, actions, liabilities, causes of action and suits for occurrence or aggravation of any past, present and future personal injuries or illnesses (physical and psychological)*, disability, disfigurement, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, fear of cancer or any other disease, fear of any other illness or condition, *increased risk of contracting cancer or any other disease*, emotional injury, fright, fear, embarrassment, psychological injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, loss of enjoyment of life, . . . (Emphasis added in italics and underlining.)[1]

[1] "INCIDENT" is defined in the Adams Release as follows:

> F. **INCIDENT** shall mean, at any and all times and through the present, the dispersion, emission, depositing, handling, storage, loading, unloading, transportation, specifying, use or distribution of any and all Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials ("NORM"), Technologically Enhanced Radioactive Materials ("TERM"), Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials ("TENORM"), any and all other radioactive substances, toxic or harmful dusts, fibers, fumes, vapors or chemicals, or products containing radioactive substances, toxic or harmful dusts, fibers, fumes, vapors or chemicals from any oilfield pipe, tubulars, scrap or equipment, or in any way attributable to or resulting from the operations of the **RELEASED PARTIES** in connection with any

Defendants further contend that plaintiff acknowledged in the Adams Release that his "mental and physical condition and all of [his] alleged damage may become worse than they are or seem to be and that in executing this AGREEMENT, [he] is completely giving up ALL CLAIMS which [he] had, has or may hereafter acquire . . .." Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff agreed that his counsel explained the terms of the release to him and that he understood all of its terms and consequences. They further contend it was legal error for the trial court to refuse to enforce the plain language of the Adams Release and to refuse to grant their exception of *res judicata* based solely on the amount of the prior settlement.

La. C.C. art. 3071 defines a compromise as a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship. A compromise settles only those differences that the parties clearly intended to settle, including the necessary consequences of what they express. La. C.C. art. 3076. A compromise does not affect rights subsequently acquired by a party, unless those rights are expressly included in the agreement. La. C.C. art. 3078. A compromise precludes the parties from bringing a subsequent action based upon the matter that was compromised. La. C.C. art. 3080. A compromise may be rescinded for error, fraud, and other grounds for the annulment of contracts. Nevertheless, a compromise cannot be rescinded on grounds of error of law or lesion. La. C.C. art. 3082.

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location or source at issue in the **LITIGATION** (as defined in Paragraph G below)**,** any and all alleged contamination of any immovable property as a result thereof *and/or any and all of **CLAIMANT'S** alleged occupational and/or residential exposure to, inhalation of and/or ingestion of any and all NORM*, TERM, TENORM, any and all other radioactive substances, toxic or harmful dusts, fibers, fumes, vapors or chemicals, or products containing radioactive substances, toxic or harmful dusts, fibers, fumes, vapors or chemicals, as well as any other exposures, accidents, illnesses or injuries sustained or claimed to have been sustained by **CLAIMANT**, whether direct, indirect, secondary, bystander, residential, occupational, or otherwise, for which the **RELEASED PARTIES** bear or are alleged to have any responsibility in the **LITIGATION**. (Emphasis added in italics and underlining.)

A compromise instrument, like other contracts, is the law between the parties and must be interpreted according to the parties' intent. *D'Amico v. Burnthorne*, 21-671 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/25/22), 362 So.3d 757, 764, *writ denied*, 22-1459 (La. 11/22/22), 350 So.3d 498. Thus, the compromise instrument is governed by the same general rules of construction applicable to contracts. *Singleton v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n*, 18-15 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/18), 258 So.3d 1074, 1076, *writ denied*, 18-1814 (La. 1/14/19), 261 So.3d 787. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent. La. C.C. art. 2046.

While the doctrine of *res judicata* is ordinarily premised on a final judgment on the merits, it also applies where there is a transaction or settlement of a disputed or compromised matter that has been entered into by the parties. *Joseph v. Huntington Ingalls Inc.*, 18-2061 (La. 1/29/20), 347 So.3d 579, 584. The purpose of the doctrine of *res judicata* is to promote judicial efficiency and the final resolution of disputes. *Singleton*, 258 So.3d at 1076-77. To succeed in an exception of *res judicata* under La. R.S. 13:4231, the party urging the exception must prove that the first judgment is (1) valid, (2) final, and (3) entered among the same parties to the second suit; (4) that the cause of action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation; and (5) that the cause of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject of the first litigation. *Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State*, 07-2469 (La. 9/8/08), 993 So.2d 187, 194.

The doctrine of *res judicata* is *stricti juris*, and any doubt concerning application of the principle of *res judicata* must be resolved against its application. *Wallace C. Drennan, Inc. v. Kerner*, 23-428 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/18/24), 409 So.3d

893, 901, *writ denied*, 25-90 (La. 4/8/25), 405 So.3d 570. The *res judicata* effect of a prior judgment is a question of law that is reviewed *de novo*. *Id.*

Defendants argue that the clear and unambiguous language of the Adams Release states that the released claims include future claims for any and all types of illnesses arising from plaintiff's exposure to NORM, which would include lung cancer. Plaintiff argues that the release language does not specifically state that he agreed to release all future lung cancer claims, particularly since he was not diagnosed with lung cancer when he executed the release in 2016. In *Joseph*, *supra,* the Louisiana Supreme Court considered similar arguments involving a tort victim who executed a release agreement as part of a settlement and later contracted mesothelioma and died after entering into the compromise. The release agreement at issue included language releasing the defendant from "any and all liability ... on account of, or in any way growing out of occupational lung diseases of any and every kind and description." *Joseph*, 347 So.3d at 583. The plaintiffs argued that the release did not affect their survival claim because it did not mention cancer or mesothelioma, and the decedent had not contracted mesothelioma at the time he executed the release.

First, the *Joseph* court stated that the Louisiana Civil Code articles governing compromises permit parties to settle claims "they may have in the present or in the future that is the subject of a lawsuit or that could result in litigation." *Id*. at 588. It further reasoned that the "Civil Code permits a compromise to be worded in general terms," citing to La. C.C. art. 2051. *Id.* at 590. Thus, the court concluded that the applicable law did not require the parties to name and identify the specific future disease or injury in order to unequivocally reflect an intent to resolve these future claims. *Id*. at 590. Based on these principles, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the release barred liability for

all occupational lung diseases, which included the plaintiffs' survival claims for mesothelioma. *Id.* at 591.

Plaintiff argues that *Joseph* is distinguishable because the plaintiff received a much larger settlement amount and had already been diagnosed with a lung disorder, pneumoconiosis. While this Court recognizes that the *Joseph* court acknowledged the difference in settlement amounts, the primary focus of the court's analysis was on the four corners of the release, wherein the plain language reflected the intent to release all future claims for mesothelioma. *Id.* at 590-91. The court explained that "the fact that Mr. Joseph was diagnosed with mesothelioma decades after signing the Release, while tragic, is not grounds to have it set aside." *Id.* at 591.

In support of his argument that the Adams Release did not include his future lung cancer claim considering the nominal amount of the settlement he received, plaintiff urges this court to follow *Breaux v. Mine Safety Appliances Co.*, 98-133 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/25/98), 717 So.2d 1255, *writ denied*, 98-2480 (La. 12/11/98), 729 So.2d 599. In *Breaux*, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment granting an exception of *res judicata* and determined that a compromise agreement executed by the plaintiff in earlier asbestos litigation did not release the defendant from liability for mesothelioma diagnosed 16 years later, particularly considering the minimal amount of the settlement. This court reasoned as follows:

> The compromise agreement cannot be extended beyond its intended meaning. Although the agreement refers to "disabilities of any nature", "past, present or future," "arising out of or in any manner whatsoever connected with or resulting from, either directly or indirectly, injury sustained or occupational diseases contracted while employed at or by Johns–Manville Corporation," it is not logical to expect that plaintiff intended to release defendant for the future manifestation of this type of cancer for $500. This is a terrible disease. If the agreement intended to include mesothelioma, defendant would surely have included it in the listed diseases. As plaintiff argues, this settlement was a nuisance settlement. Thus, we find that the language

> of the agreement does not include the contraction of this type of cancer which would not manifest for many years, nor did plaintiff intend to include it in the settlement. Plaintiff signed the agreement expressly because he did not have any of the asbestos related diseases at that time.

Id. at 1257.

However, *Breaux* was decided well prior to the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in *Joseph* in 2020, which clarified that the release does not need to specifically identify a disease or injury in order to establish the parties' intent to release a future claim. Further, when the release language clearly and expressly releases liability for the future claim at issue, the settlement amount that the party receives for the release is irrelevant. See *Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc.*, 22-610, 2023 WL 4825239, p. 7 (E.D. La. July 26, 2023); see also La. C.C. art. 3082 (providing that a compromise cannot be rescinded on grounds of lesion). "It is not the province of the court to relieve a party of a bad bargain, no matter how harsh." *Joseph*, 347 So.3d at 591.

In *Robichaux*, *supra*, the court determined that language releasing defendants from all future claims arising from exposure to asbestos expressly released the plaintiff's claims for mesothelioma because asbestos-caused mesothelioma is an illness arising from asbestos exposure. *Id.* at p. 6, 7. The *Robichaux* court further reasoned that "[l]egal documents have consequences, and our system of justice presupposes words in release documents, which are contracts, shall be given their plain and ordinary meaning." *Id.* at p. 7.

Just as in *Joseph* and *Robichaux*, we find the language of the Adams Release is clear and unambiguous and evidences the parties' express intent to release all future claims arising from plaintiff's exposure to NORM — including his lung cancer claim alleged to be caused by NORM exposure. Plaintiff affirmed that his counsel explained the terms of the release to him and that he understood the effect and consequences of the Adams Release. Considering all of these factors, we find

that the trial court erred by failing to recognize the preclusive effect of the Adams Release and by failing to grant defendants' exception of *res judicata*.

Accordingly, we grant the writ application, reverse the trial court's judgment denying the exception, grant the exception of *res judicata* filed by defendants, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. and Marathon Oil Company, and dismiss plaintiff's claims against them with prejudice.

<u>WRIT GRANTED</u>

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
State of Louisiana

No. 26-C-130

LOUIS NOEL

versus

CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., ET AL

JOHNSON, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS

I, respectfully, dissent from the majority disposition in this matter. For the following reasons, I would apply *Breaux v. Mine Safety Appliances Company*, 98-133 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/25/98), 717 So.2d 1255, and deny the writ application.

In this matter, on May 6, 2025, Plaintiff/Respondent, Louis Noel, filed a petition for damages against several defendants, alleging he contracted lung cancer due to workplace exposure to Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials ("NORM"). In response, Defendants/Relators, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. and Marathon Oil Company, re-urged exceptions of *res judicata*, basing their exceptions on the ground that Mr. Noel previously compromised the claims he now asserts and released them from liability.[1] Defendants argued that, on June 27, 2016, Mr. Noel executed a "Confidential Release and Indemnity Agreement" ("the Release"), wherein he expressly released all past, present, and future claims—specifically including any and all claims for cancer—arising out of or

[1] Defendants' first exceptions of *res judicata* were overruled by the trial court, and their supervisory writs were denied by this Court in *Noel v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.*, 26-90 (La. App. 5 Cir. 03/09/26), 2026 WL 655492.

related to NORM exposure.[2] In opposition to Defendants' exception, Mr. Noel argued that construing the Release to encompass a future lung cancer claim for the nominal consideration paid would be an absurd result and contrary to his intent.

Defendants' re-urged exception of *res judicata* was heard by the trial court on March 11, 2026.[3] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally overruled the exception. On March 23, 2026, the trial court issued a written judgment to the same effect.

The issue before this Court is whether Mr. Noel intentionally released Defendants from all personal injury claims—including future claims for cancer arising from his occupational NORM exposure—through the Release he signed with Defendants in 2016 in exchange for the nominal amount he received, thereby requiring dismissal of his subsequent action.

In *Breaux*, *supra*, this Court considered whether *res judicata* should have been applied to a $500 settlement executed in 1983 that discharged the employer from all future claims of any nature arising out of or in any manner whatsoever arising from employment. The plaintiff was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 1996 and filed his action against the defendant in 1997. The defendant filed an exception of *res judicata*, arguing the plaintiff had settled his rights against it in the 1983 settlement. *Id*., 717 So.2d at 1256. The trial court sustained the exception and dismissed the plaintiff's action. On appellate review, this Court reversed the ruling, characterizing the agreement as a nuisance settlement and

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[2] Mr. Noel executed the Release to resolve his previous actions against Chevron U.S.A., Inc. and Marathon Oil Company in *Dottie Adams, et al. v. Joseph Grefer, et al.*, 24th Judicial District Court, Docket No. 624-278, and against Marathon Oil Company in *Lester v. Exxon Mobil Corp*., No. 14-cv-1824 (E.D. La., dismissed Aug. 11, 2021). Mr. Noel alleges that his lung cancer had not manifested and/or was not diagnosed at the time the Release executed.

[3] Defendants orally re-urged their exceptions of *res judicata* while at the exception hearing originally set for co-defendants, Exxon Mobil Corporation and ExxonMobil Oil. Defendants adopted their previously filed exceptions and exhibits, and the trial court allowed the exceptions to be heard. Mr. Noel's counsel did not raise an objection.

concluding it was illogical to expect that the plaintiff intended to release the defendant for the future manifestation of mesothelioma for $500. *Id*. at 1257.

The holding in *Breaux* was revisited in *Joseph v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated*, 18-2061 (La. 1/29/20), 347 So.3d 579. In *Joseph*, the plaintiff filed suit against his former employer in 1982 for occupational exposure to toxic materials, which resulted in his contraction of pneumoconiosis. In 1985, the plaintiff settled his claims through an agreement, wherein the plaintiff released the employer of any and all liability in any way growing out of occupational lung diseases of any and every kind and description. Decades later, in 2016, the plaintiff filed a subsequent action against the employer, alleging he contracted mesothelioma as a result of occupational exposure to highly toxic chemicals. Shortly after filing the second action, the plaintiff died, and his children were substituted as plaintiffs. *Id*. In response, the employer filed an exception of *res judicata*, arguing the 1985 settlement barred the plaintiffs' survival action.

Both the trial and appellate courts overruled the employer's exception. On review, the Louisiana Supreme Court sustained the employer's exception, finding the plaintiff had released the employer in 1985 for all present and future occupational lung diseases and personal injury claims arising out his employment, in exchange for a sum of money ($25,000). In reaching its conclusion, the court reasoned that the plaintiff's claims "in light of the attending events and circumstances (***including but not limited to the fact that the amount of the settlement was not a nominal sum***)" fell squarely within the terms of the 1985 release. *Id*., 347 So.3d at 592. (Emphasis added). The court noted, "*Breaux* should not be read for the proposition that the failure to specifically name cancer, mesothelioma, or any other disease in a release is in and of itself

indicative of an intent to exclude that condition from the release, as the law clearly permits releases to be worded in general terms." *Id.*, at 590 n.8.

Although *Breaux* predates *Joseph*, *Breaux* was not overruled by the supreme court. While specific diseases are not required to be listed in a release, *Joseph* leaves room to consider the amount of a prior settlement when determining the parties' intent. As such, *Breaux* should be considered as controlling jurisprudence by this Circuit. Despite its reference to *Joseph* and *Breaux*, the majority disposition completely neglects consideration of the amount of the settlement, with no regard for exceptions.[4]

When reviewing the settlement amounts involved in this matter and *Breaux*, one fact is consistent: the plaintiffs received significantly insufficient settlement amounts. Over the course of decades[5], claimants in similar cases have received meager amounts—including here—as consideration for being exposed to toxic chemicals that can cause drastic changes to their lives. Like the panel in *Breaux*, I find that settlements for those nominal amounts are nuisance settlements. In the interest of justice for the general public, courts should not be prohibited from considering the amount of the settlement in deciding the intent of the parties and whether *res judicata* should be applied to dismiss a subsequent action.

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[4] La. R.S. 13:4232 provides,

A. A judgment does not bar another action by the plaintiff:
(1) When exceptional circumstances justify relief from the res judicata effect of the judgment;
(2) When the judgment dismissed the first action first action without prejudice; or,
(3) When the judgment reserved the right of the plaintiff to bring another action.

Under this provision, the court has the authority to exercise its discretion to balance the principle of *res judicata* with the interests of justice, although clearly "this discretion must be exercised on a case-by-case basis and such relief should be granted only in truly exceptional cases… ." *Wallace C. Drennan, Inc. v. Kerner*, 23-428 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/18/24), 409 So.3d 893, 902, *writ denied*, 25-90 (La. 4/8/25), 405 So.3d 570, quoting *Woodlands Development, L.L.C. v. Regions Bank*, 16-324 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/21/16), 209 So.3d 335, 341. The exception provided in Subsection (A)(1) is applicable to this matter.

[5] The plaintiff in *Breaux* settled for $500 in 1983. Mr. Noel settled with Defendants in 2016 for a nominal amount.

After reviewing the facts of this case and applicable jurisprudence (particularly the June 27, 2016 settlement release, *Joseph*, and *Breaux*), I opine it is illogical to conclude Mr. Noel intended to release Defendants from liability for the lung cancer he later developed due to NORM exposure in exchange for a very nominal sum. For the foregoing reasons, I find that this case presents an exceptional circumstance, justifying relief from *res judicata*. Accordingly, I would deny the writ application and remand the matter for further proceedings.

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY
CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH **UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5** THIS DAY **MAY 19, 2026** TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

CURTIS B. PURSELL
CLERK OF COURT

26-C-130

E-NOTIFIED

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE DONALD L. FORET (DISTRICT JUDGE)
KELICIA D. RAYA (RELATOR)
GREGORY M. MCNALLY (RELATOR)
EDWARD PAIGE SENSENBRENNER (RESPONDENT)
JARRETT S. FALCON (RESPONDENT)
MARK E. BEST (RESPONDENT)
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JENNIFER L. MARTIN (RESPONDENT)

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NO ATTORNEYS WERE MAILED